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HomeMy WebLinkAboutRPT 4 POLITICAL SIGN ORD 7-2-84z, ! nter - C om Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council Community Development Department REVIEW OF POLITICAL SIGN ORDINANCE Ot scusst off During the last municipal election, complaints were received concerning illegal placement and the extensive number of candidate signs posted in the city of Tustin. Specifically, the majority of complaints concerned the posting of signs' on public, utility poles and other structures within the public right-of-way which is specifically prohibited. Additionally,. very large candidate signs were placed throughout the City which had a significant visual impact on the community's aesthetics. Following the last election, City Council in April directed staff and the City Attorney to research case law and recommend ways to c-orrect the problems experienced during the last election. The City Attorney's office has prepared the attached memorandum outlining in detail Tustin's present code regulations and case law which dictates the maximum restrictions a city may impose. Taking case law into consideration and Council concerns, the following might be considered in amending our political sign ordinance: 1. Increase the bond or cash deposit amount to a level which would cover the City's cost to remove signs not removed by the candidate following elec~ion day. 2. In addition to the residential district maximum sign area of 18 square feet, establish maximum sign sizes for properties in commercial and industrial zones. Staff and the City Attorney will be prepared to discuss this subject at the Council meeting. Re¢omendatton Pleasure of the Council. Director of Community Development DDL:jh Attachment: Inter-office memorandum from City Attorney o / 7/84 Inter-Corn DATE: FROH: SUBJECT: Mr. D. Lamm, Director of Community Development James G. Rourke, City Attorney Suzanne Atkins, Deputy City Attorney Campaign Sign Regulations You have requested, pursuant to your Inter-Com dated May 16, 1984, that this office research the maximum restrictions a city may legally implement relative to the regulation of campaign signs. The following is a discussion of the judicial rulings Pertaining to a municipality's authority to regulate the posting of campaign signs. Cities are authorized to regulate signs and billboards and advertisements of all types in and on streets, buildings, fences or other structures pursuant to Government Code Sections 65850(b) and 38774. Regulation of signs may be accomplished by zoning, or by regulation and abatement of a public nuisance. In accordance with this enabling legislation, most cities have enacted ordinances regulating signs, as to size, location, and safety factors. The reasonable regulation of signs has been broadly con- strued by the Courts, as a valid exercise of its police power to promote public health, safety, and welfare. (California Constitu- tion Article 11, Section 7.) Most judicial decisions upholding the validity of sign regulations are based upon such police power purposes and rationale as public safety, promotion of economics, aesthetics, and general welfare. Further, Penal Code Sections 556 and 556.1 make it a misde- meanor for any person to place or maintain a sign or advertise- ment, without lawful permission, upon any property of a city, or upon any property in which this person has no estate or right of possession. Further, any such sign or advertisement placed on property contrary to the provisions of Sections 556 and 556.1, is a public nuisance. Penal Code Section 556.3. The City of Tustin enacted Section 9483 of the Tustin City Code, which specifically regulates the posting of political signs. Tustin City Code Section 9483 provides that political signs having to do with, "... any issue, candidate, or group of candidates in any district, municipal, county, state or federal elec- tion, shall be permitted, subject to the following: 1. Any person, party or group posting political signs shall first post a cash bond or cash deposit in the amount of Fifty ($50) Dollars with the City of Tustin. 2. Ail such signs shall be removed not later than 48 hours following the date of the election. In the event all signs are not removed within the specified time period, the bond shall be forfeited in its entirety, and the City shall have the right to remove and dispose of same. 3. Compliance with Section 9444(c) of this Chapter, which prohibits the affixing of any sign on any tree, traffic sign post, traffic signal post, or any other official traffic sign or traffic control device. 4. The permission of the property owner for signs on private property. 5. Signs in residential districts shall be limited to six square feet per candidate or issue with maximum aggregate sign area of 18 square feet." A municipality's authority to regulate the posting of poli- tical campaign signs is, however, not unlimited. Political sign regulations are frequently challenged on constitutional grounds. Political sign ordinances may be challenged on the grounds that the regulation denies equal protection of the laws, in that it makes an unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory classification. The judicial test for equal protection purposes appears to be that the classification must not be arbitrarily made for the mere purpose of classification, but must be based upon some distinction, natural, intrinsic, or constitutional, which sug- gests a reason for and justifies the particular legislation. City of Santa ~ v,. ~odern Neon ~ ~omp~lD_Y (1961) 189 Cal.App.2d 188, 193. Equal protection attacks on political sign regulations have seldom been successful. In recent years, there have also been numerous attempts to attack sign regulations as violating constitutionally protected free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Con- stitution. Such attacks, in California, have thus far been unsuccessful. However, in order to assess whether the City of Tustin's sign ordinance may be made more restrictive, it is necessary to review the principles from the 9th Circuit law and the United States Supreme Court. -2- in Baldwin v. Redwood ~, 540 F.2d 1360 (9th Cir. 1976), the Court, in its examination of a comprehensive ordinance regu- lating the posting of temporary signs on p_~ property, eluci- dated the following general rule: "Incidental restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may be imposed in furtherance of a legitimate governmental interest, that interest is unrelated to suppression of expression and is substan- tial in relation to the restriction imposed, and if the restrictions are no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the governmental interest." Proceeding under this principle, the Court, in BaldHin, found that the provisions of the challenged Ordinance limiting individual signs to a maximum area of 16 square feet, and limiting the aggregate area of signs on a single parcel to 80 square feet, was constitutional. The Court observed that both limitations contributed to the City's legitimate concern for the appearance of the community, which concern was based, in part, on its experience with the affects of the elements, particularly the wind, on reinforced signs of various sizes. Especially persuasive to the Court was the fact that neither limitations significantly deterred the exercise of First Amendment rights, and neither was in any way related to the content of the affected signs. Because the burden imposed on free expression by the limitations was so minimal, the Court indicated that generous allowances could be made for municipal preferences in the means to attain its legitimate governmental interests. ]~, 540 F.2d at 1369. However, the Court in Baldwin invalidated provisions of the City's ordinance which imposed permit and inspection fee require- ments, restricted the aggregate area of signs, and excluded campaign signs from residential zones. One year later in Y_e~ v. ~ Qf ~, 548 F.2d 262 (gth Cir., 1977), the Court affirmed the principle it had announced in BaldHin. The ordinance under consideration in ~9/j~ contained a number of provisions g~verning the use of political campaign signs, including a provision which limited such signs to an area of four square feet. As in BaldHin, the ~ court concluded that size restrictions may be enforced, "as long as the . . . limitations are not so restrictive as to foreclose an effective exercise of First Amendment rights." Id. The most recent comment on the efforts of municipalities to regulate where and how political campaign signs may be displayed, is articulated in ~_F~_a_y_9/=~ for ~ v- citv ~!g_~, 682 F.2d 847 (9th Cir., 1982), Prob. Jur. Noted, 103 Supreme Court 1180, -3- 75 Lawyer's Edition 2d 429 (1983). Taxpayers concerned an ordi- nance which entirely ~ the posting of signs on numerous types of public property. The Taxpayers case arose in 1979, when a group called Taxpayers for Vincent, stapled City Council candidate Roland Vincent's posters on utility poles. Los Angeles City employees removed the posters in an effort to enforce the City's ordinance forbidding the posting of signs on public property. Taxpayers for Vincent sued, alleging that their right to free speech had been abridged. The Supreme Court recently ruled that it had not been. The Court found that the ordinance was narrowly tailored to meet Los Angeles' legitimate and significant goal of protecting the City's aesthetics. Further, the First Amendment was not violated because the ban applied equally to everyone, and Vincent's backers could have advertised their candidate's virtues elsewhere and in other ways. A new statement of principles to be applied to laws regulating First Amendment rights was enunciated in Taxpayers as follows: 1. The law is presumptively unconstitutional, and the Government bears the burden of justification. 2. The law must bear a "substantial relation" to a governmental interest. The law cannot be justified merely by the showing of some legitimate interest. 3. The law must be the least drastic means of protecting the governmental interest involved; its restrictions may be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the governmental interest. In order to assess in what ways the City of Tustin's Sign Ordinance may be made more restrictive, it is thus necessary to apply the above principles from the 9th Circuit law and the Supreme Court, as well as State law. The Federal and State cases indicate that a municipality may regulate the size, location, and other physical attributes of political signs in the interest of public safety, health and welfare, as does the City of Tustin's Sign Ordinance. Clearly, in the aftermath of Taxpayers, the City may prohibit the placement of political signs on certain types of public property, but is still precluded from a similar prohibi- tion on private property. However, in determining whether to make existing Code provisions relative to political campaign signs more restrictive, or to enact further restrictions, the City should carefully balance whether the proposed regulation furthers a legitimate governmental interest in a manner least restrictive to free political expression. JGR:SA:pj:D:06/27/84(13.) cc: WH -4-