Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAboutVOTERS CHOOSE SYSTEM0 VOTERS Choose Policy Recommendations A BETTER S • Implement a point -based ranked choice voting method. Introduction RECEIVED AT THE TUSTIN CITY COUNCIL MEETING AUG 2 0 2019 CITY CLERK'S OFFICE • Voter turnout in Tustin, like much of Orange County, consistently lies in the low 50% range, meaning that elections consistently miss representing much of the population. Part of the problem is that the current system does not take into account the complex preferences we all have about politics in our cities and schools. We need a simple system that takes preferences into account, encouraging voters to turnout, and that ensures satisfaction with our representatives. The Voters Choose method, based on a system known as Borda Count, improves upon existing ranked -choice voting (RCV) methods by removing the need for complicated transfers and translating voter ranks to points. Voters' first choices receive the most points and subsequent choices all receive gradually reducing point values. Our system is cost-effective, easy to understand and explain, and ensures that all voter preferences matter. Background • The current Tustin system poses two main problems: it doesn't take all voter preferences into account and it does not promote collaboration among elected leaders. Approval voting often encourages "bullet voting," making the multiple vote options useless. Simple majority voting forces people into one of two camps, which stifles the number of political choices each voter receives. • A ranked choice voting system would allow citizens to rank their options and show how the degree of support they have for each candidate. Translating their ranks into points ensures a simple, understandable way to declare winners that the people of Tustin want to represent them. Our system also promotes collaboration, since candidates are not only vying for the electorate's first -choice votes but also lower ranks This promotes cooperation among similarly -minded candidates. Analysis The Voters Choose method solves the problems of the Tustin system by implementing a simple ranked -choice voting system. Our method would translate all voter rankings to decreasing point values from their first choice. Then all point values would be summed per candidate and the candidates with the most points are elected. The system delivers more proportionality than the existing system in a simpler manner while also taking all voter preferences into account. Voters Choose I vote rschoose.info I voterschoose@gmail.com 1F Tnaithecal L i St &I"rd o Out: Tustin's Electoral Background �C�rI'ERS ("'hoose �_ AT THE TUSTIN CITY COUNCIL MEETING AUG 2 0 2019 CITY CLERK'S OFFICE The Tustin City Council elects its members by givirk ��� to check off up to 2 or 3 boxes, depending on the number of seats up for re-election. The problem is that it keeps you from stating how you truly feel about politicians: even though you may like a candidate, it doesn't show your favorite candidate how much you support him or her. X99, f �pu Jo Information Presidential General Date: 2016-11-08 Precinct: RESULTS Nam. Votes Parc - CHARLES E "CHUCK'PUCKETT 73862 28% LETITIA CLARK 12748 26% ALLAN BERNSTEIN 11974 24% \1 AUSTIN LUMBARD 9900 2G% A --I Winner by Precinct �. CHARLES E. "CHUCK" PUCKETT LETITIA CLARK 114 ALLAN BERNSTEIN AUSTIN LUMBARD l The 2016 election for the city council was so close because people couldn't give preferences, only the candidates they "liked." The Tustin School Board used to have this system, but will now only give you the choice to check one box in a trustee area. This system is even worse! This system is why we have a two-party system: a conservative third party hurts votes for the Republicans, and vice -versa. This has led to polarization, vitriolic politics, and gridlock. Tustin ISD Adopted Map 2 6 Election Timing 2018: Areas 3 & 5 2020: Areas 1, 2, & 4 Find your address on this map to your future trustee area! 03rd 0 VC)"FERS Choose Why Support Voters Choose? Our System We propose a simple, low-cost method of electing our officials that helps elect moderates who listen to your needs. Hnw22 Our ranked -choice system is especially designed to be fair, simple, and representative: 1. All voters can rank up to their top five choices (including write- ins), and these are optional rankings, meaning you have a choice in the number of candidates you support 2. Each number gets point values 3. Officials add all the points up at the end 4. Election officials choose the winner based on the candidate(s) with the highest points Why It Works: The Voters Choose system not only allows you to choose among candidates- who you like- but also between candidates- how much you like them. This process does not intentionally favor a party or ideology; instead, it encourages a type of candidate, one who can appeal to many communities. It's a step towards making elections represent everyone's voice. Are you ready to make elections work for you? Nico Silva August 20, 2019 A Time for Reform RECEIVED AT THE TUSTIN CITY COUNCIL MEETIN'_ AUG 20 2019 CITY CLERK'S OFFICE Thank you to the Mayor, the City, and the people of Tustin for the opportunity to speak. My name is Nicholas Silva, and as a leader of Voters Choose, I think I can add to our public dialogue tonight. You have heard from my teammates; they explained our ideas and our work. I am also here to ask that you put Rank and Add to a 2020 vote, but I want you to know why we do our work here, specifically in Tustin. To do that, I have to be honest- Tustin is my home away from home. I live in Santa Ana, so in fact, when the team pitched me on all of their efforts here, at first I felt unsure if I would belong. Those doubts faded when I served among you, for the people of Tustin are one of a kind. The public concerts, the street fairs, the local clubs all reveal the workings of a vibrant civic life, and a public that cares for its City. Few cities in Southern California have that infrastructure built for people like us to organize anew. Beyond most of us living here, then, we saw the value of proposing reform in a city that would really make it its own. Moreover, meeting Tustonians confirmed (for me) that Tustin's elections needed a change. Take it from me: my city is going the way of district -based elections, and it has done nothing but cost us time and money. Rank and Add is a simple change, because it reflects the way we make our decisions daily. After all, no one likes both the Angels and the Dodgers, USC and UCLA equally; they can't all be first! These teams use Rank and Add because they want direct ways to pick their favorite candidates. The truth is that we are not that different here. Voters Choose wants our work to better this City. As long as we have a commission, and then let the voters dictate our progress, I have faith that we can choose what is best for our community. As I part, I want to remind everyone that we do not make decisions today for us alone. I am sure many of you have driven down El Camino Real, or seen the bust of Tustin, Columbus Tustin, in Old Town. You may not think of Spanish missionaries, or of sycamore trees, but they have shaped you through the legacies their decisions have left. I look at new developments, from the District to Old Town, and I am reminded how politics really matters. We need systems in place that keep people informed and excited about their city. Put Rank and Add on the ballot, and you add your name to the many who have shaped our great community. Thank you. 0n0 VOTERS Choose 2nd ❑ 3rd ❑ RECEIVED AT THE TUSTIN CITY COUNCIL MEETING AUG 2 U 2019 CITY CLERK'S OFFICE REFORMING THE TUSTIN CITY COUNCIL'S ELECTORAL RULES Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules Executive Summary In this report, Voters Choose proposes a bold and pragmatic solution to confront the impending threat of mandated, costly changes to Tustin's electoral system. The proposal is cost-effective and satisfies the framework of the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) on the people's terms, not a court's. In the past decade, cities across Southern California like Tustin, including Buena Park, Costa Mesa, and Garden Grove, have already succumbed to abandon at - large elections, and adopt ineffective district models. Even in localities that comply with demand letters from these outsiders, the city or school district must reimburse an author up to $30,000 for research on racial polarization in electoral patterns. The Tustin Unified School District fell victim to these unnecessary expenses in 2016 and now operates under a district -based system that ultimately is worse for Tustin's residents. Thus, the law has forced cities into lackluster compromises at the expense of their financial health and their residents. But Tustin can do things in a different and better waythat represents its citizens. Voters Choose has an electoral reform that optimizes representation for Tustin 1) geographically, where representatives are accountable to an area; 2) ideologically, where representatives respond to their constituents' interests; and 3) descriptively, where representatives themselves represent the demographics of the community. Rank and Add Voting allows individual voters to rank a set of candidates (1st 2nd 3rd etc.), at which point each ranking gets a point value (1st=1 point, 2nd =�/2 point, 3rd=1/a point, etc.) and the sums determine the winner. All of this can be achieved in an easy, affordable way; no other system improves the quality of elections and ensures the city council can maintain the public's confidence for years to come. In short, it balances key priorities of a government, which includes representing the voices of minorities, but also giving moderates the chance to win broad, popular majorities. The Rank and Add system proposed here yields results that satisfy both current laws and fair representation of voters' nuanced preferences through elegant simplicity. 2 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules Background Information: The Problem A. Tustin's Electoral Context Like many Orange County city councils, Tustin elects its representatives with a variation of the Block Voting System. Simply put, this system elects multiple representatives (in Tustin's case, 3 each presidential cycle and 2 each midterm election) to a governing body, where voters can "check -mark" as many candidates as are the number of seats up for election' It uses at -large campaigning to encourage candidates to appeal to the whole community, and still allows people to vote for individual candidates in order to make elections non-partisan. Block Voting served two key purposes for its first adopters. First, as noted, it allowed them to make elections nonpartisan. At the same time, it also achieved a race -motivated goal for many of them because, in lieu of party candidates in district -based elections, they could curate a "Good Government" slate for majority -white cities .2 These slates made it easy to ignore the political minority's voice, often African-American; if half plus one of the population check -marked five candidates into office consistently, there was not much the other half minus one could do3 Although Tustin's candidates today do not operate on such a nefarious incentive, the fact that any political majority can employ this strategy can make Block Voting ideologically, descriptively and (potentially) geographically unrepresentative. As long as liberals and conservatives live in different parts of a city and look different from each other, slates can carve out a winning majority and ignore other groups. Then, if the political majority shifts, a council could change from operating with close to an unanimously -conservative council to a liberal one. Also, any independent, non -slate candidate has to corral his or her supporters to "bullet vote" (only check -mark his or her name) to have a fighting chance. This strategic voting is unfair to those voters' choices, because the system (not their preferences) prevents them from voting for other, ideologically -similar candidates they like. It is also unfair to candidates, who lack a clear path to victory when there are innumerable ways for extremists or "partisans" to game the system. That is why this model is under siege across the state, and why cities who keep it face challenging times ahead. ' Reynolds et. al., 44. 2 Davidson and Korbel, 989. 3 See George Pillsbury, "The Bias of At -Large Elections: How It Works." Nonprofit VOTE, August 16, 2017, accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.nonprofitvote.org/bias-large-elections-works/. 3 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules B. Lawsuits under the California Voting Rights Act With racial disenfranchisement in mind, the California legislature proposed a solution in the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA). This law bans the use of at -large elections when "protected classes" have low impact on electoral outcomes. In its place, communities have to use a by- or from -district trustee model, where individuals run respectively within or from specific areas to represent them 4 The Tustin School Board recently underwent this process and, even though they complied with the complaining attorney's demands without a costly lawsuit, they still had to reimburse him $30,000 to avoid a multi-million dollar lawsuits Throughout Southern California, cities have changed their electoral system under this duress, or have failed to defend themselves from these suits. In all these communities, local ethnic minorities outnumbered a white plurality or minority population, and plaintiffs won cases on the argument that the governing bodies were not reflective of that fact. Examples include Anaheim, Palmdale, and Garden Grove, and all changed to by -district electoral systems.6 Even when minorities have won office in a particular year, courts still have the precedent to rule that Block Voting is systematically unfair and change the system anyway.' Tustin, too, is a majority -minority city: as of 2018, the non -Hispanic white population counted for 29.8% of the city, while Hispanics alone accounted for 41.3%, Asian residents for 22.4%, and Black residents for another 2.4%.8 Therefore, while Tustin has previously had minority representation that mirrors the city's demographics, the CVRA will enable plaintiffs to change Block Voting systems, irrespective of its history. The failure of these lawsuits and demands is both their inability to produce any more than minimal substantive change for minorities in cities and their effect of producing a worse system, compared to Block Voting. Voters Choose does not aim to benefit from suits or threats thereof, but rather proposes reforms as a way to avoid them. It is our organization's interest to 4 For more of a thorough explanation, see A.B.182, Sess. of 2015 (Alejo. 2015), https://Ieginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bilINavClient.xhtml?bill_id= 201520160AB182 5Susan Christian Could ing,'Tustin Unified approves by -area elections of school board members," The Orange County Register, May 16, 2017, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/16/tustin-unified-approves-by- area-elections- of -school -board -members/ a Chris Haire, "Local voting in historic upheaval as cities change how officials are elected," The Orange County Register, October 23, 2016, https://www.ocregister.com/2016/10/23/local-voting-in-historic- u pheava I -as -cities -ch a nge-how-officia Is -are -elected/ 7 Ruiz V. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543 (1998). s "Race and Ethnicity in Tustin, California (City)," https://statisticalatias.com/place/California/Tustin/Race- and-Ethnicity 4 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules educate and advocate for better voting and representation for the communities we serve. Districted elections give spurious benefits over Block Voting, at best. Districts can incentivize elected officials to prioritize their districts' concerns over the city's in order to improve geographic representation. If an ethnic minority primarily lives in one area of a community, like the old segregated South, that group can receive better descriptive representation,9 although it becomes harder for districted councilmembers to work together on city-wide issues. Otherwise, many groups are not be sufficiently concentrated to benefit from districts, which, especially in California, include Asian and Hispanic Americans, women, and young people.10 Tustin's minority populations fit this model, because, even with some level of racial concentration, there are substantial percentages which live outside those areas.' It is thus more likely that voters will have fewer candidate choices in their districts, because a single -seat contest promotes two-party or -faction competitions, and that their ballots will fail to elect their preferred candidate, wasting votes12 Candidates, even minorities, without significant resources and attention will struggle to capture a majority in each of their districts; and incumbents who choose this option risk alienating themselves from their constituencies. For these reasons, we find this arrangement a solution Tustin would be better off avoiding. If Tustin wants to avoid the cost of a suit and the net negatives of district -based elections, it will need to adopt new voting rules. Reform is feasible, and this proposal recommends a change that exceeds the representational goals of the CVRA where Tustin's voters choose with a much - clearer voice. 9 David Lublin and Shaun Bowler, "Representation of Ethnic Minorities," Oxford Handbooks Online., Sep. 2017, 6. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2015). DOI: 10.1093/oxford h b/978190258658.013.26 10 Ibid. 11 "Race and Ethnicity in Tustin, California (City)," https://statisticalatias.com/place/California/Tustin/Race- and-Ethnicity 12 Gary W. Cox, "Strategic Voting in Single -Member Single -Ballot Systems," in Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 76. 5 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules The Solution: Rank and Add Voting Our analysis finds that three electoral principles matter most for Tustin, a diverse but politically -moderate city.13 First, an electoral system must promote geographic representation by giving independent candidates a real chance of victory; slates can draw their candidates from the same communities that support them. Second, it must ensure that all parts of Tustin are represented - in other words, that the 50%+ ideological majority should have three or more seats on the council consistently, but that the rest of the population should always have an elected representative, too. Third, to create descriptive representation, minority candidates need the flexibility to aggregate support from their communities, no matter where they live in the city. We hold that the Rank and Add system best fits these criteria. A. The Borda Count Family Voters Choose prefers the Borda Count (BC) family, especially Rank and Add, for combining the best of these principles in a simple, easy-to-use format. A weighted ranked -choice voting category, BC systems allow voters to order the candidates standing for election and assigns each of the rankings (1st 2nd 3rd, etc.) a point value14 Figure 1 outlines the typical ways that governing bodies structure the points: Figure 1: Rank and Add Voting Typology (N=Total Preferences) Ranking Standard #1 Standard #2 Rank and Add Voting 1 N N-1 1 2 5 4 1/2 3 4 3 1/3 4 3 2 1/4 5 2 1 1/5 N 1 0 1/N 13 Martin Wisckol and Susan C. Goulding, "Long -conservative Tustin now tilts Democrat." Orange County Register, August 16, 2016, https://vwvw.ocregister.com/2016/08/16/long-conservative-tustin-now-tilts- democrat/. 14 William Poundstone, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do about It), 1st ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008),140. 6 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules We will note that, despite the differences, all of them produce similar outcomes most of the time, provided that the number of rankings remain fairly small (under 10). Otherwise, since the standard types are equally -spaced apart, they resemble the Block Voting method (e.g. when the 1 ranking is (26/25) times more valuable). With that said, it is important that voters have the option to rank multiple candidates, or else everyone is not much better off from First Past the Post. One common property to all these Borda Count variations is that they give voters the most- comprehensive voice in elections. Scholars report that BC elections tend to produce victories for the "most widely supported candidate, or the most broadly acceptable option ... [i.e.] the least unpopular."15 That means that a voter's rankings are more likely to correspond to the candidates who end up winning seats; and that is because each point value, no matter the system, is fixed to a ranking in advance. Broadly -palatable candidates also tend to be centrists in these systems, so a positive byproduct is that the democratic voice in this system makes a functioning, stable government easier and more likely.16 It also means that more people are represented by their elected officials, which improves satisfaction with the outcome and trust in the government, and that officials will be more accountable, which means this solution is positive for the democratic majority. Citizens will be able to continue electing the candidates they preferred before the reform, but under rules that are more representative. In addition, BC levels the playing field for independent candidates, past and present. As we found, slates have a built-in advantage in most electoral systems, because candidates within slates have an incentive not to compete with each other. In Block Voting, for example, it does not matter how popular each candidate in a slate is because check -marks equal one point. The best strategy, therefore, is to ask the slate's base to support every candidate to guarantee them all victory. In Borda Count, by contrast, all the rankings count at once and have different values, so even if candidates decide to partner, there is a benefit to 1) being the most popular and 2) earning lower rankings from voters outside the partnership's base. When elections are about aggregating voter preferences and not a percentage of voters' support, as these benefits indicate, we expect 1513enjamin Reilly, "Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the Pacific Island Countries," International Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (October 2002):361, https.,//doi.org/10.1177/0192512102023004002. 16 Reilly, 361. 7 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules that candidates will still have an opportunity to run as an independent, if they so choose. This is helpful for minority representation, because independent candidates that may vary by geography and identity now have a fairer shot at victory; but also gives a democratic majority more of a voice, because it can use the ballot to craft its own "slate" of preferred candidates, B. Examples Several case studies in diverse societies prove that all Borda Count methods can work in societies similar to Tustin. Three countries use it for at least some part of their national elections: Kiribati, Nauru, and Slovenia. Kiribati and Slovenia both use the Standard #1 method for tabulating, while Nauru uses the Rank and Add method." In Kiribati, members of the I -Kiribati parliament use the Standard #1 of Borda Count to select the four candidates that voters will pick from to become president (a complicated system, to be sure). Slovenia uses the first standard again for the election of two seats reserved for the country's Hungarian and Italian ethnic minorities,, signaling their belief that Rank and Add Voting provides better descriptive Representation and consensus -based politics. In addition, a major new Spanish party, Ahora Madrid, utilizes the Rank and Add method for ail their primarycandidates19 Nauru seemed to us the most similar case to Tustin's political dynamic. A small island country in the Pacific Ocean, Nauru uses the Rank and Add method to select multiple candidates for multiple seats, like an at -large city council race. There, they have seen the election of moderate candidates under this system and have had "democratic longevity with a high degree of social pluralism" (i.e. a large number of competing groups and factions).20 In the US, Borda Count is primarily practiced in non-governmental organizations. Today, variants of BC determine the winner of the Heisman Trophy, the MLB MVP Award, and even the Associated Press's College Football rankings.21 Significantly, with Voters Choose's advocacy, Harvard College's student government, the Undergraduate Council (UC), implemented the Rank and Add method for its legislative and presidential elections this past fall, 17 Reilly, 367; Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, "The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives: Comparing Scoring Rules in Nauru and Slovenia," Australian Journal of Political Science 49, no. 2 (April 3, 2014):202, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.900530. 18 Fraenkel and Grofman, "The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives," 196. 19 Cecilia Nicolini and Quinton Mayne. 2019, Feb. "Disrupting the Party: A case study of Ahora Madrid." Accessed March 2019, 20 Reilly, 369; Fraenkel and Grofman,'The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives," 198. 21 "Borda's Method: A Scoring System." Lecture. Accessed March 2018. https://www3.nd.edu/-apilking/Mathl0170/Information/ Lectures/Lecture-2.Borda Method.pdf. Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules replacing (respectively) STV and AV contests.22Turnout markedly increased, and 43% female and 57% ethnic minority representation corresponded well to a majority -minority school.23 Students were only allowed to rank three candidates, but many still chose to rank multiple candidates, leading the head of the Harvard Open Data Project commented that "strategic voting is not happening" with Rank and Add in the 2018 UC presidential elections.24 These results lead us to believe that we can expect more voter participation and engagement in a Tustin Borda Count election, especially under the Rank and Add method. The absence of strategic voting indicated that voters typically have a variety of preferences that are not married to parties or slates. Rank and Add gives voters the flexibility to associate with candidates who might carry another label or identity, but with whom they can align on at least some policy issues. The Harvard elections signal that this will result in ideological and descriptive Representation for Tustin minorities; because female and minority candidates won in record numbers through these broadly -palatable channels. In this section, we sought to demonstrate that, on the basis of Representation in its various forms, Tustin would have better elections in the future with a Rank and Add model. We will now discuss and attempt to address concerns you and the City might have about implementation, including financial, legal, and usage information. 12 Jonah S. Berger, "Undergraduate Council Adopts New Voting Method for Elections," The Harvard Crimson, September 10, 2018, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/9/10/uc-voting-system/. 23 Ibid. 24 Jonah S. Berger, "Harvard Open Data Project Predicts Palaniappan and Huesa Will Win UC Pace," The Harvard Crimson, November 15, 2018, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/11/15/2018-open-data- project-uc/. 9 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules Implementation A. Financial Information We have done our part to research what it might cost to implement Rank and Add for future city council elections. First, research suggests that other ranked -type elections have not cost cities significantly more to administer in the short- or long-term, compared to at -large or district elections 25 While there was an increase in expenses of about $0.42 per voter on average across PCV cities during the first electoral cycle of implementation, cities saved about $0.20 per voter on average each electoral cycle thereafter (because they reduced the number of run-off and off -cycle elections). We expect implementation costs tobeeven less for Tustin, first because a points process, unlike the transfer methods, do not require sophisticated software; and because Neal Kelley from the OC Registrar of Voters attested that the county is looking to change voting machines, giving the City a window of opportunity to make this electoral reform even more cost-effective. Much of these costs are variable, but we anticipate short-term expenses of around $12,500-$17,500, including the change in machines and community education costs, and then potential savings of $2,000-$5,000 each succeeding election. As we will also discuss, the city council will likely need to put this initiative forward to the voters, at which point the reform could cost an additional one- time $5,00047,000 administration fee. At the same time, we urge you to weigh these against the concrete financial costs of inaction. Should Tustin ignore electoral reform altogether, it is likelythat proponents of the CVRA will tryto forcibly change its elections, as we mentioned occurred with Tustin's school board and with other OC cities. In addition to the $30,000 reimbursement fee, there could also be unanticipated costs that arise from printing two types of ballots each election cycle (if Tustin decides to stagger candidates as it currently does), and the City will probably need to run another education campaign, too, so people understand why and how the system is changing. This is all to say that Rank and Add, for all the benefits it brings to Representation, is not a more -costly proposal. We will also note that the City could save most on Rank and Add's hypothetical costs by deciding to run all of its 5 seats fully at large, which would save $20,000-$30,000 every four years. In Block Voting elections, there is a justified hesitation towards running elections fully at -large, both because slates can be unrepresentative for broad swaths of the public and can be 21 Christopher Rhode, "The Cost of Ranked Choice Voting," The Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center (2014):2, https://esra.wisc.edu/papers/Rhode.pdf. 10 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules unstable, too, for they may need to shift ideologically at anytime drastically to maintain the public's support. Rank and Add removes these concerns, because, as we mentioned, slates are less advantageous, and because there is a unique moderating tendency in the system; so, the more seats there are up for election, the more representative elections become and the more stability in governance they bring. B. Legal information The clearest way we see the City adopting a Borda Count electoral model is to adopt an Article II charter for Tustin's by-laws. A charter version of Article II would allow the City to amend its electoral laws exclusively and align with the State on all other issues, which keeps the political scope of this proposal purposefully narrow. The California Constitution says that cities can adopt these charters in two steps. First, a governing body (in this case, the Tustin City Council) proposes a charter, and then the public approves it by majority vote, like any other city measure.26 If the City undertakes deliberations this year, it could likely put a measure up for a vote by the 2020 primary election. Should the public decide to adopt the proposal, we expect that the city will not face any further legal obstacles. According to Electoral Law Professor Nicholas Stephanopoulos at Harvard Law School, and confirmed by our research, the existing body of cases against other ranked -choice voting systems have never overturned a government's or populace's decision to implement election reform in their community. Court precedent also suggests that Article II charters are completely legal ways to experiment with better forms of representation .27 C. Usage Information Up until now, we have discussed Borda Count mostly in the common benefits it brings. When deciding between each of the Borda Count options, though, each system makes different assumptions that can swing races at the margins. The lowest -sum and standard methods produce similar results, because the distance between each preference remains the same; each assume that voters have an equal and linear differential between preferences (10-9=2-1). While this is a very proportional system between votes and seats, this system grows unruly as races grow larger; as the number of rankings 26 California Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(b). 27 Cowdrey v. Redondo Beach, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, httpsV/caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal P772269.html 11 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules available to voters increase, a first -place ranking becomes less and less meaningful compared to the second, and the more the system resembles Block Voting. By contrast, the Dowdall method produces different results because there is not an equal difference between each preference (1-1/2 # 1/2 - 1/3).28 There, preferences exponentially decrease, so that one needs at least 2 "2" rankings to overcome a I," but the values are more constant and less affected by the number of seats or candidates in the contest. If the City Council decides to move a Rank and Add proposal to the voters, Voters Choose can offer its advice and support throughout the process. We have informational statements on hand, and we will gladly develop more so that Tustin's residents can understand the basic procedure and the deeper value of representation this system will provide. In that process, we could support the establishment of community presentations; our team leaders and volunteers can field questions and act as a resource. 211 Reilly, 17. 12 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules Recommendations As a team, our research committee sought to share the current state of electoral reform in Tustin to demonstrate that electoral reform is a net benefit for the City under a Rank and Add method. Of the systems we described, all similar in outcomes and in costs, we recommend that the Tustin City Council adopt Rank and Add method for future at -large city council races. While all Borda Count sets would give voters more satisfaction with the outcome and more representation in all forms, our Rank and Add method will best accommodate an increase in voter and candidate participation in future elections. That is because, unlike the standard methods, the 1 ranking is consistently more meaningful than other rankings in Rank and Add, no matter how many rankings are allowed. It would still be valuable to get lower -placed rankings, so this allows independent candidates to run; but this makes the first 5-7 rankings most important and should thus make elections more stable and predictable for the City. In case the City needs to set rankings in advance, the Rank and Add method, as practiced at Harvard, works in a representative way, so we recommend that the City allow at least 5 rankings each election so that voters can make full use of the system. Then, our subsidiary recommendation is that the City adopt this electoral system in a four-year cycle to achieve cost savings, more representation, and more stability in government. We are publishing this report in the spirit of democracy and to foster a debate among the citizens and elected officials of Tustin. Our hope is that the evidence presented in the proposal clarifies the current threats to Tustin's elections and provides evidence to why Rank and Add is the solution for our city. 13 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules Appendix: Other Electoral Reforms Two other, sub -optimal electoral reforms deserve mention, because they have operated legally within the CVRA and demonstrate that Rank and Add. can exist alongside district -based elections. This discussion indicates the ultimate shortcomings of these other systems. The first is called the Alternative Vote (AV)—it allows voters to rank candidates (like the Rank and Add)—but counts all the ballots in a series of rounds. It is currently used in San Francisco and Oakland for single -seat elections but could apply city-wide in what is called the Single Transferable Vote (STV).29 These systems try to create ideological representation by guaranteeing a voter that, if their first -placed candidate is not elected, their vote will apply to latter -ranked candidates in later rounds 30 When these transfers eliminate candidates, though, they also eliminate the ballots of voters who only voted for them, a phenomenon called "ballot exhaustion."31 This makes it challenging for independent candidates to run because there is no easy path to ensure 2nd and 3rd rankings will benefit them, as opposed to a slate of candidates, who can instruct voters to align their preferences in a certain way to guarantee a fully -useful transferring. As in Block Voting, these slates can dampen the ability to achieve all forms of Representation in a city council. The other is called Cumulative Voting, which allows voters to distribute a set number of points among candidates and serves another alternative after a district court recently ordered Mission Viejo to begin using it32 Like the CVRA's district voting, it was offered as a solution to minority underrepresentation in the city and can undermine ideological Representation in the process. As the main advocate admitted, and UCI Irvine Professor Donald Saari confirmed, a voting bloc on the political extreme gains an advantage with this system, because they can put all their points behind a candidate- a form of bullet voting33 As Block Voting over -represents the majority, Cumulative Voting does so for minority populations. 29 Craig M. Burnett and Vladimir Kogan, "Ballot (and voter) "exhaustion" under Instant Runoff Voting: An examination of four ranked -choice elections," Electoral Studies, vol. 37. (Elsevier, 2015), 44-45. 30 Burnett and Kogan, 42. 31 Burnett and Kogan, 42. 32 Alicia Robinson, "Mission Viejo will go its own way with new'cumulative voting' system." Orange County Register, July 30, 2018, https://www.ocregister.com/2018/07/30/mission-viejo-will-go-its-own-way- with-new-cumu lative-voti ng -system/. 33Ibid.