HomeMy WebLinkAboutVOTERS CHOOSE SYSTEM0 VOTERS Choose
Policy Recommendations
A BETTER S
• Implement a point -based ranked choice voting method.
Introduction
RECEIVED
AT THE TUSTIN
CITY COUNCIL MEETING
AUG 2 0 2019
CITY CLERK'S OFFICE
• Voter turnout in Tustin, like much of Orange County, consistently lies in the low
50% range, meaning that elections consistently miss representing much of the
population. Part of the problem is that the current system does not take into
account the complex preferences we all have about politics in our cities and
schools. We need a simple system that takes preferences into account,
encouraging voters to turnout, and that ensures satisfaction with our
representatives.
The Voters Choose method, based on a system known as Borda Count,
improves upon existing ranked -choice voting (RCV) methods by removing the
need for complicated transfers and translating voter ranks to points. Voters' first
choices receive the most points and subsequent choices all receive gradually
reducing point values. Our system is cost-effective, easy to understand and
explain, and ensures that all voter preferences matter.
Background
• The current Tustin system poses two main problems: it doesn't take all voter
preferences into account and it does not promote collaboration among elected
leaders. Approval voting often encourages "bullet voting," making the multiple
vote options useless. Simple majority voting forces people into one of two camps,
which stifles the number of political choices each voter receives.
• A ranked choice voting system would allow citizens to rank their options and
show how the degree of support they have for each candidate. Translating their
ranks into points ensures a simple, understandable way to declare winners that
the people of Tustin want to represent them. Our system also promotes
collaboration, since candidates are not only vying for the electorate's first -choice
votes but also lower ranks This promotes cooperation among similarly -minded
candidates.
Analysis
The Voters Choose method solves the problems of the Tustin system by
implementing a simple ranked -choice voting system. Our method would translate
all voter rankings to decreasing point values from their first choice. Then all point
values would be summed per candidate and the candidates with the most points
are elected. The system delivers more proportionality than the existing system in
a simpler manner while also taking all voter preferences into account.
Voters Choose I vote rschoose.info I voterschoose@gmail.com
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Tnaithecal L i St &I"rd o
Out: Tustin's Electoral
Background
�C�rI'ERS ("'hoose
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AT THE TUSTIN
CITY COUNCIL MEETING
AUG 2 0 2019
CITY CLERK'S OFFICE
The Tustin City Council elects its members by givirk ���
to check off up to 2 or 3 boxes, depending on the number of seats
up for re-election.
The problem is that it
keeps you from stating
how you truly feel about
politicians: even though
you may like a
candidate, it doesn't
show your favorite
candidate how much
you support him or her.
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Information
Presidential General
Date: 2016-11-08
Precinct:
RESULTS
Nam.
Votes Parc
- CHARLES E
"CHUCK'PUCKETT
73862 28%
LETITIA CLARK
12748 26%
ALLAN BERNSTEIN
11974 24%
\1 AUSTIN LUMBARD
9900 2G%
A --I
Winner by Precinct
�. CHARLES E. "CHUCK"
PUCKETT
LETITIA CLARK 114
ALLAN BERNSTEIN
AUSTIN LUMBARD
l
The 2016 election for the city council was so close because people
couldn't give preferences, only the candidates they "liked."
The Tustin School Board used to have this system, but will now only
give you the choice to check one box in a trustee area.
This system is even worse! This system is
why we have a two-party system: a
conservative third party hurts votes for the
Republicans, and vice -versa. This has led
to polarization, vitriolic politics, and
gridlock.
Tustin ISD
Adopted Map
2
6
Election Timing
2018: Areas 3 & 5
2020: Areas 1, 2, & 4
Find your address on this map to your future trustee area!
03rd 0 VC)"FERS Choose
Why Support
Voters Choose?
Our System
We propose a simple, low-cost method of electing our officials that
helps elect moderates who listen to your needs.
Hnw22
Our ranked -choice system is especially designed to be fair, simple,
and representative:
1. All voters can rank up to their top five choices (including write-
ins), and these are optional rankings, meaning you have a
choice in the number of candidates you support
2. Each number gets point values
3. Officials add all the points up at the end
4. Election officials choose the winner based on the candidate(s)
with the highest points
Why It Works: The Voters Choose system not only allows you to
choose among candidates- who you like- but also between
candidates- how much you like them. This process does not
intentionally favor a party or ideology; instead, it encourages a type
of candidate, one who can appeal to many communities. It's a step
towards making elections represent everyone's voice.
Are you ready to make elections work for you?
Nico Silva
August 20, 2019
A Time for Reform
RECEIVED
AT THE TUSTIN
CITY COUNCIL MEETIN'_
AUG 20 2019
CITY CLERK'S OFFICE
Thank you to the Mayor, the City, and the people of Tustin for the
opportunity to speak. My name is Nicholas Silva, and as a leader of
Voters Choose, I think I can add to our public dialogue tonight. You
have heard from my teammates; they explained our ideas and our work.
I am also here to ask that you put Rank and Add to a 2020 vote, but I
want you to know why we do our work here, specifically in Tustin.
To do that, I have to be honest- Tustin is my home away from home.
I live in Santa Ana, so in fact, when the team pitched me on all of their
efforts here, at first I felt unsure if I would belong. Those doubts faded
when I served among you, for the people of Tustin are one of a kind.
The public concerts, the street fairs, the local clubs all reveal the
workings of a vibrant civic life, and a public that cares for its City. Few
cities in Southern California have that infrastructure built for people like
us to organize anew. Beyond most of us living here, then, we saw the
value of proposing reform in a city that would really make it its own.
Moreover, meeting Tustonians confirmed (for me) that Tustin's
elections needed a change. Take it from me: my city is going the way of
district -based elections, and it has done nothing but cost us time and
money. Rank and Add is a simple change, because it reflects the way we
make our decisions daily. After all, no one likes both the Angels and the
Dodgers, USC and UCLA equally; they can't all be first! These teams
use Rank and Add because they want direct ways to pick their favorite
candidates. The truth is that we are not that different here. Voters
Choose wants our work to better this City. As long as we have a
commission, and then let the voters dictate our progress, I have faith that
we can choose what is best for our community.
As I part, I want to remind everyone that we do not make decisions
today for us alone. I am sure many of you have driven down El Camino
Real, or seen the bust of Tustin, Columbus Tustin, in Old Town. You
may not think of Spanish missionaries, or of sycamore trees, but they
have shaped you through the legacies their decisions have left. I look at
new developments, from the District to Old Town, and I am reminded
how politics really matters. We need systems in place that keep people
informed and excited about their city. Put Rank and Add on the ballot,
and you add your name to the many who have shaped our great
community. Thank you.
0n0 VOTERS Choose
2nd ❑
3rd ❑
RECEIVED
AT THE TUSTIN
CITY COUNCIL MEETING
AUG 2 U 2019
CITY CLERK'S OFFICE
REFORMING THE TUSTIN
CITY COUNCIL'S
ELECTORAL RULES
Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
Executive Summary
In this report, Voters Choose proposes a bold and pragmatic solution to
confront the impending threat of mandated, costly changes to Tustin's
electoral system. The proposal is cost-effective and satisfies the framework of
the California Voting Rights Act (CVRA) on the people's terms, not a court's. In
the past decade, cities across Southern California like Tustin, including Buena
Park, Costa Mesa, and Garden Grove, have already succumbed to abandon at -
large elections, and adopt ineffective district models. Even in localities that
comply with demand letters from these outsiders, the city or school district
must reimburse an author up to $30,000 for research on racial polarization in
electoral patterns. The Tustin Unified School District fell victim to these
unnecessary expenses in 2016 and now operates under a district -based system
that ultimately is worse for Tustin's residents. Thus, the law has forced cities
into lackluster compromises at the expense of their financial health and their
residents.
But Tustin can do things in a different and better waythat represents its
citizens. Voters Choose has an electoral reform that optimizes representation
for Tustin 1) geographically, where representatives are accountable to an area;
2) ideologically, where representatives respond to their constituents' interests;
and 3) descriptively, where representatives themselves represent the
demographics of the community. Rank and Add Voting allows individual
voters to rank a set of candidates (1st 2nd 3rd etc.), at which point each ranking
gets a point value (1st=1 point, 2nd =�/2 point, 3rd=1/a point, etc.) and the sums
determine the winner. All of this can be achieved in an easy, affordable way; no
other system improves the quality of elections and ensures the city council can
maintain the public's confidence for years to come. In short, it balances key
priorities of a government, which includes representing the voices of
minorities, but also giving moderates the chance to win broad, popular
majorities. The Rank and Add system proposed here yields results that satisfy
both current laws and fair representation of voters' nuanced preferences
through elegant simplicity.
2 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
Background Information: The Problem
A. Tustin's Electoral Context
Like many Orange County city councils, Tustin elects its representatives
with a variation of the Block Voting System. Simply put, this system elects
multiple representatives (in Tustin's case, 3 each presidential cycle and 2 each
midterm election) to a governing body, where voters can "check -mark" as
many candidates as are the number of seats up for election' It uses at -large
campaigning to encourage candidates to appeal to the whole community,
and still allows people to vote for individual candidates in order to make
elections non-partisan.
Block Voting served two key purposes for its first adopters. First, as
noted, it allowed them to make elections nonpartisan. At the same time, it also
achieved a race -motivated goal for many of them because, in lieu of party
candidates in district -based elections, they could curate a "Good Government"
slate for majority -white cities .2 These slates made it easy to ignore the political
minority's voice, often African-American; if half plus one of the population
check -marked five candidates into office consistently, there was not much the
other half minus one could do3
Although Tustin's candidates today do not operate on such a nefarious
incentive, the fact that any political majority can employ this strategy can
make Block Voting ideologically, descriptively and (potentially) geographically
unrepresentative. As long as liberals and conservatives live in different parts of
a city and look different from each other, slates can carve out a winning
majority and ignore other groups. Then, if the political majority shifts, a council
could change from operating with close to an unanimously -conservative
council to a liberal one. Also, any independent, non -slate candidate has to
corral his or her supporters to "bullet vote" (only check -mark his or her name)
to have a fighting chance. This strategic voting is unfair to those voters'
choices, because the system (not their preferences) prevents them from
voting for other, ideologically -similar candidates they like. It is also unfair to
candidates, who lack a clear path to victory when there are innumerable ways
for extremists or "partisans" to game the system. That is why this model is
under siege across the state, and why cities who keep it face challenging times
ahead.
' Reynolds et. al., 44.
2 Davidson and Korbel, 989.
3 See George Pillsbury, "The Bias of At -Large Elections: How It Works." Nonprofit VOTE, August 16, 2017,
accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.nonprofitvote.org/bias-large-elections-works/.
3 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
B. Lawsuits under the California Voting Rights Act
With racial disenfranchisement in mind, the California legislature
proposed a solution in the California Voting Rights Act of 2001 (CVRA). This law
bans the use of at -large elections when "protected classes" have low impact on
electoral outcomes. In its place, communities have to use a by- or from -district
trustee model, where individuals run respectively within or from specific areas
to represent them 4 The Tustin School Board recently underwent this process
and, even though they complied with the complaining attorney's demands
without a costly lawsuit, they still had to reimburse him $30,000 to avoid a
multi-million dollar lawsuits
Throughout Southern California, cities have changed their electoral
system under this duress, or have failed to defend themselves from these suits.
In all these communities, local ethnic minorities outnumbered a white
plurality or minority population, and plaintiffs won cases on the argument that
the governing bodies were not reflective of that fact. Examples include
Anaheim, Palmdale, and Garden Grove, and all changed to by -district electoral
systems.6 Even when minorities have won office in a particular year, courts still
have the precedent to rule that Block Voting is systematically unfair and
change the system anyway.'
Tustin, too, is a majority -minority city: as of 2018, the non -Hispanic white
population counted for 29.8% of the city, while Hispanics alone accounted for
41.3%, Asian residents for 22.4%, and Black residents for another 2.4%.8
Therefore, while Tustin has previously had minority representation that mirrors
the city's demographics, the CVRA will enable plaintiffs to change Block
Voting systems, irrespective of its history.
The failure of these lawsuits and demands is both their inability to
produce any more than minimal substantive change for minorities in cities
and their effect of producing a worse system, compared to Block Voting.
Voters Choose does not aim to benefit from suits or threats thereof, but rather
proposes reforms as a way to avoid them. It is our organization's interest to
4 For more of a thorough explanation, see A.B.182, Sess. of 2015 (Alejo. 2015),
https://Ieginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bilINavClient.xhtml?bill_id= 201520160AB182
5Susan Christian Could ing,'Tustin Unified approves by -area elections of school board members," The
Orange County Register, May 16, 2017, https://www.ocregister.com/2017/05/16/tustin-unified-approves-by-
area-elections- of -school -board -members/
a Chris Haire, "Local voting in historic upheaval as cities change how officials are elected," The Orange
County Register, October 23, 2016, https://www.ocregister.com/2016/10/23/local-voting-in-historic-
u pheava I -as -cities -ch a nge-how-officia Is -are -elected/
7 Ruiz V. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543 (1998).
s "Race and Ethnicity in Tustin, California (City)," https://statisticalatias.com/place/California/Tustin/Race-
and-Ethnicity
4 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
educate and advocate for better voting and representation for the
communities we serve.
Districted elections give spurious benefits over Block Voting, at best.
Districts can incentivize elected officials to prioritize their districts' concerns
over the city's in order to improve geographic representation. If an ethnic
minority primarily lives in one area of a community, like the old segregated
South, that group can receive better descriptive representation,9 although it
becomes harder for districted councilmembers to work together on city-wide
issues. Otherwise, many groups are not be sufficiently concentrated to benefit
from districts, which, especially in California, include Asian and Hispanic
Americans, women, and young people.10 Tustin's minority populations fit this
model, because, even with some level of racial concentration, there are
substantial percentages which live outside those areas.'
It is thus more likely that voters will have fewer candidate choices in
their districts, because a single -seat contest promotes two-party or -faction
competitions, and that their ballots will fail to elect their preferred candidate,
wasting votes12 Candidates, even minorities, without significant resources and
attention will struggle to capture a majority in each of their districts; and
incumbents who choose this option risk alienating themselves from their
constituencies. For these reasons, we find this arrangement a solution Tustin
would be better off avoiding.
If Tustin wants to avoid the cost of a suit and the net negatives of
district -based elections, it will need to adopt new voting rules. Reform is
feasible, and this proposal recommends a change that exceeds the
representational goals of the CVRA where Tustin's voters choose with a much -
clearer voice.
9 David Lublin and Shaun Bowler, "Representation of Ethnic Minorities," Oxford Handbooks Online., Sep.
2017, 6. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2015). DOI: 10.1093/oxford h b/978190258658.013.26
10 Ibid.
11 "Race and Ethnicity in Tustin, California (City)," https://statisticalatias.com/place/California/Tustin/Race-
and-Ethnicity
12 Gary W. Cox, "Strategic Voting in Single -Member Single -Ballot Systems," in Making Votes Count:
Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997),
76.
5 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
The Solution: Rank and Add Voting
Our analysis finds that three electoral principles matter most for Tustin, a
diverse but politically -moderate city.13 First, an electoral system must promote
geographic representation by giving independent candidates a real chance of
victory; slates can draw their candidates from the same communities that
support them. Second, it must ensure that all parts of Tustin are represented -
in other words, that the 50%+ ideological majority should have three or more
seats on the council consistently, but that the rest of the population should
always have an elected representative, too. Third, to create descriptive
representation, minority candidates need the flexibility to aggregate support
from their communities, no matter where they live in the city. We hold that
the Rank and Add system best fits these criteria.
A. The Borda Count Family
Voters Choose prefers the Borda Count (BC) family, especially Rank and
Add, for combining the best of these principles in a simple, easy-to-use format.
A weighted ranked -choice voting category, BC systems allow voters to order
the candidates standing for election and assigns each of the rankings (1st 2nd
3rd, etc.) a point value14 Figure 1 outlines the typical ways that governing bodies
structure the points:
Figure 1: Rank and Add Voting Typology (N=Total Preferences)
Ranking
Standard #1
Standard #2
Rank and Add Voting
1
N
N-1
1
2
5
4
1/2
3
4
3
1/3
4
3
2
1/4
5
2
1
1/5
N
1
0
1/N
13 Martin Wisckol and Susan C. Goulding, "Long -conservative Tustin now tilts Democrat." Orange County
Register, August 16, 2016, https://vwvw.ocregister.com/2016/08/16/long-conservative-tustin-now-tilts-
democrat/.
14 William Poundstone, Gaming the Vote: Why Elections Aren't Fair (and What We Can Do about It), 1st
ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008),140.
6 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
We will note that, despite the differences, all of them produce similar
outcomes most of the time, provided that the number of rankings remain
fairly small (under 10). Otherwise, since the standard types are equally -spaced
apart, they resemble the Block Voting method (e.g. when the 1 ranking is
(26/25) times more valuable). With that said, it is important that voters have
the option to rank multiple candidates, or else everyone is not much better off
from First Past the Post.
One common property to all these Borda Count variations is that they
give voters the most- comprehensive voice in elections. Scholars report that
BC elections tend to produce victories for the "most widely supported
candidate, or the most broadly acceptable option ... [i.e.] the least unpopular."15
That means that a voter's rankings are more likely to correspond to the
candidates who end up winning seats; and that is because each point value,
no matter the system, is fixed to a ranking in advance. Broadly -palatable
candidates also tend to be centrists in these systems, so a positive byproduct is
that the democratic voice in this system makes a functioning, stable
government easier and more likely.16 It also means that more people are
represented by their elected officials, which improves satisfaction with the
outcome and trust in the government, and that officials will be more
accountable, which means this solution is positive for the democratic majority.
Citizens will be able to continue electing the candidates they preferred before
the reform, but under rules that are more representative.
In addition, BC levels the playing field for independent candidates, past
and present. As we found, slates have a built-in advantage in most electoral
systems, because candidates within slates have an incentive not to compete
with each other. In Block Voting, for example, it does not matter how popular
each candidate in a slate is because check -marks equal one point. The best
strategy, therefore, is to ask the slate's base to support every candidate to
guarantee them all victory.
In Borda Count, by contrast, all the rankings count at once and have
different values, so even if candidates decide to partner, there is a benefit to 1)
being the most popular and 2) earning lower rankings from voters outside the
partnership's base. When elections are about aggregating voter preferences
and not a percentage of voters' support, as these benefits indicate, we expect
1513enjamin Reilly, "Social Choice in the South Seas: Electoral Innovation and the Borda Count in the
Pacific Island Countries," International Political Science Review 23, no. 4 (October 2002):361,
https.,//doi.org/10.1177/0192512102023004002.
16 Reilly, 361.
7 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
that candidates will still have an opportunity to run as an independent, if they
so choose. This is helpful for minority representation, because independent
candidates that may vary by geography and identity now have a fairer shot at
victory; but also gives a democratic majority more of a voice, because it can
use the ballot to craft its own "slate" of preferred candidates,
B. Examples
Several case studies in diverse societies prove that all Borda Count
methods can work in societies similar to Tustin. Three countries use it for at
least some part of their national elections: Kiribati, Nauru, and Slovenia. Kiribati
and Slovenia both use the Standard #1 method for tabulating, while Nauru
uses the Rank and Add method." In Kiribati, members of the I -Kiribati
parliament use the Standard #1 of Borda Count to select the four candidates
that voters will pick from to become president (a complicated system, to be
sure). Slovenia uses the first standard again for the election of two seats
reserved for the country's Hungarian and Italian ethnic minorities,, signaling
their belief that Rank and Add Voting provides better descriptive
Representation and consensus -based politics. In addition, a major new
Spanish party, Ahora Madrid, utilizes the Rank and Add method for ail their
primarycandidates19
Nauru seemed to us the most similar case to Tustin's political dynamic. A
small island country in the Pacific Ocean, Nauru uses the Rank and Add
method to select multiple candidates for multiple seats, like an at -large city
council race. There, they have seen the election of moderate candidates under
this system and have had "democratic longevity with a high degree of social
pluralism" (i.e. a large number of competing groups and factions).20
In the US, Borda Count is primarily practiced in non-governmental
organizations. Today, variants of BC determine the winner of the Heisman
Trophy, the MLB MVP Award, and even the Associated Press's College Football
rankings.21 Significantly, with Voters Choose's advocacy, Harvard College's
student government, the Undergraduate Council (UC), implemented the Rank
and Add method for its legislative and presidential elections this past fall,
17 Reilly, 367; Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, "The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives:
Comparing Scoring Rules in Nauru and Slovenia," Australian Journal of Political Science 49, no. 2 (April 3,
2014):202, https://doi.org/10.1080/10361146.2014.900530.
18 Fraenkel and Grofman, "The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives," 196.
19 Cecilia Nicolini and Quinton Mayne. 2019, Feb. "Disrupting the Party: A case study of Ahora Madrid."
Accessed March 2019,
20 Reilly, 369; Fraenkel and Grofman,'The Borda Count and Its Real -World Alternatives," 198.
21 "Borda's Method: A Scoring System." Lecture. Accessed March 2018.
https://www3.nd.edu/-apilking/Mathl0170/Information/ Lectures/Lecture-2.Borda Method.pdf.
Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
replacing (respectively) STV and AV contests.22Turnout markedly increased,
and 43% female and 57% ethnic minority representation corresponded well to
a majority -minority school.23 Students were only allowed to rank three
candidates, but many still chose to rank multiple candidates, leading the head
of the Harvard Open Data Project commented that "strategic voting is not
happening" with Rank and Add in the 2018 UC presidential elections.24
These results lead us to believe that we can expect more voter
participation and engagement in a Tustin Borda Count election, especially
under the Rank and Add method. The absence of strategic voting indicated
that voters typically have a variety of preferences that are not married to
parties or slates. Rank and Add gives voters the flexibility to associate with
candidates who might carry another label or identity, but with whom they can
align on at least some policy issues. The Harvard elections signal that this will
result in ideological and descriptive Representation for Tustin minorities;
because female and minority candidates won in record numbers through
these broadly -palatable channels.
In this section, we sought to demonstrate that, on the basis of
Representation in its various forms, Tustin would have better elections in the
future with a Rank and Add model. We will now discuss and attempt to
address concerns you and the City might have about implementation,
including financial, legal, and usage information.
12 Jonah S. Berger, "Undergraduate Council Adopts New Voting Method for Elections," The Harvard
Crimson, September 10, 2018, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/9/10/uc-voting-system/.
23 Ibid.
24 Jonah S. Berger, "Harvard Open Data Project Predicts Palaniappan and Huesa Will Win UC Pace," The
Harvard Crimson, November 15, 2018, http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/11/15/2018-open-data-
project-uc/.
9 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
Implementation
A. Financial Information
We have done our part to research what it might cost to implement
Rank and Add for future city council elections. First, research suggests that
other ranked -type elections have not cost cities significantly more to
administer in the short- or long-term, compared to at -large or district
elections 25 While there was an increase in expenses of about $0.42 per voter
on average across PCV cities during the first electoral cycle of implementation,
cities saved about $0.20 per voter on average each electoral cycle thereafter
(because they reduced the number of run-off and off -cycle elections). We
expect implementation costs tobeeven less for Tustin, first because a points
process, unlike the transfer methods, do not require sophisticated software;
and because Neal Kelley from the OC Registrar of Voters attested that the
county is looking to change voting machines, giving the City a window of
opportunity to make this electoral reform even more cost-effective. Much of
these costs are variable, but we anticipate short-term expenses of around
$12,500-$17,500, including the change in machines and community education
costs, and then potential savings of $2,000-$5,000 each succeeding election.
As we will also discuss, the city council will likely need to put this initiative
forward to the voters, at which point the reform could cost an additional one-
time $5,00047,000 administration fee.
At the same time, we urge you to weigh these against the concrete
financial costs of inaction. Should Tustin ignore electoral reform altogether, it is
likelythat proponents of the CVRA will tryto forcibly change its elections, as
we mentioned occurred with Tustin's school board and with other OC cities. In
addition to the $30,000 reimbursement fee, there could also be unanticipated
costs that arise from printing two types of ballots each election cycle (if Tustin
decides to stagger candidates as it currently does), and the City will probably
need to run another education campaign, too, so people understand why and
how the system is changing. This is all to say that Rank and Add, for all the
benefits it brings to Representation, is not a more -costly proposal.
We will also note that the City could save most on Rank and Add's
hypothetical costs by deciding to run all of its 5 seats fully at large, which
would save $20,000-$30,000 every four years. In Block Voting elections, there
is a justified hesitation towards running elections fully at -large, both because
slates can be unrepresentative for broad swaths of the public and can be
21 Christopher Rhode, "The Cost of Ranked Choice Voting," The Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center
(2014):2, https://esra.wisc.edu/papers/Rhode.pdf.
10 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
unstable, too, for they may need to shift ideologically at anytime drastically to
maintain the public's support. Rank and Add removes these concerns,
because, as we mentioned, slates are less advantageous, and because there is
a unique moderating tendency in the system; so, the more seats there are up
for election, the more representative elections become and the more stability
in governance they bring.
B. Legal information
The clearest way we see the City adopting a Borda Count electoral
model is to adopt an Article II charter for Tustin's by-laws. A charter version of
Article II would allow the City to amend its electoral laws exclusively and align
with the State on all other issues, which keeps the political scope of this
proposal purposefully narrow. The California Constitution says that cities can
adopt these charters in two steps. First, a governing body (in this case, the
Tustin City Council) proposes a charter, and then the public approves it by
majority vote, like any other city measure.26 If the City undertakes deliberations
this year, it could likely put a measure up for a vote by the 2020 primary
election.
Should the public decide to adopt the proposal, we expect that the city
will not face any further legal obstacles. According to Electoral Law Professor
Nicholas Stephanopoulos at Harvard Law School, and confirmed by our
research, the existing body of cases against other ranked -choice voting
systems have never overturned a government's or populace's decision to
implement election reform in their community. Court precedent also suggests
that Article II charters are completely legal ways to experiment with better
forms of representation .27
C. Usage Information
Up until now, we have discussed Borda Count mostly in the common
benefits it brings. When deciding between each of the Borda Count options,
though, each system makes different assumptions that can swing races at the
margins. The lowest -sum and standard methods produce similar results,
because the distance between each preference remains the same; each
assume that voters have an equal and linear differential between preferences
(10-9=2-1). While this is a very proportional system between votes and seats,
this system grows unruly as races grow larger; as the number of rankings
26 California Constitution, Article XI, Section 3(b).
27 Cowdrey v. Redondo Beach, Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3,
httpsV/caselaw.findlaw.com/ca-court-of-appeal P772269.html
11 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
available to voters increase, a first -place ranking becomes less and less
meaningful compared to the second, and the more the system resembles
Block Voting. By contrast, the Dowdall method produces different results
because there is not an equal difference between each preference (1-1/2 # 1/2 -
1/3).28 There, preferences exponentially decrease, so that one needs at least 2 "2"
rankings to overcome a I," but the values are more constant and less affected
by the number of seats or candidates in the contest.
If the City Council decides to move a Rank and Add proposal to the voters,
Voters Choose can offer its advice and support throughout the process. We
have informational statements on hand, and we will gladly develop more so
that Tustin's residents can understand the basic procedure and the deeper
value of representation this system will provide. In that process, we could
support the establishment of community presentations; our team leaders and
volunteers can field questions and act as a resource.
211 Reilly, 17.
12 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
Recommendations
As a team, our research committee sought to share the current state of
electoral reform in Tustin to demonstrate that electoral reform is a net benefit
for the City under a Rank and Add method. Of the systems we described, all
similar in outcomes and in costs, we recommend that the Tustin City Council
adopt Rank and Add method for future at -large city council races. While all
Borda Count sets would give voters more satisfaction with the outcome and
more representation in all forms, our Rank and Add method will best
accommodate an increase in voter and candidate participation in future
elections. That is because, unlike the standard methods, the 1 ranking is
consistently more meaningful than other rankings in Rank and Add, no matter
how many rankings are allowed. It would still be valuable to get lower -placed
rankings, so this allows independent candidates to run; but this makes the first
5-7 rankings most important and should thus make elections more stable and
predictable for the City. In case the City needs to set rankings in advance, the
Rank and Add method, as practiced at Harvard, works in a representative way,
so we recommend that the City allow at least 5 rankings each election so that
voters can make full use of the system. Then, our subsidiary recommendation
is that the City adopt this electoral system in a four-year cycle to achieve cost
savings, more representation, and more stability in government.
We are publishing this report in the spirit of democracy and to foster a
debate among the citizens and elected officials of Tustin. Our hope is that the
evidence presented in the proposal clarifies the current threats to Tustin's
elections and provides evidence to why Rank and Add is the solution for our
city.
13 Voters Choose: Reforming the Tustin City Council's Electoral Rules
Appendix: Other Electoral Reforms
Two other, sub -optimal electoral reforms deserve mention, because they
have operated legally within the CVRA and demonstrate that Rank and Add.
can exist alongside district -based elections. This discussion indicates the
ultimate shortcomings of these other systems.
The first is called the Alternative Vote (AV)—it allows voters to rank
candidates (like the Rank and Add)—but counts all the ballots in a series of
rounds. It is currently used in San Francisco and Oakland for single -seat
elections but could apply city-wide in what is called the Single Transferable
Vote (STV).29 These systems try to create ideological representation by
guaranteeing a voter that, if their first -placed candidate is not elected, their
vote will apply to latter -ranked candidates in later rounds 30
When these transfers eliminate candidates, though, they also eliminate
the ballots of voters who only voted for them, a phenomenon called "ballot
exhaustion."31 This makes it challenging for independent candidates to run
because there is no easy path to ensure 2nd and 3rd rankings will benefit them,
as opposed to a slate of candidates, who can instruct voters to align their
preferences in a certain way to guarantee a fully -useful transferring. As in
Block Voting, these slates can dampen the ability to achieve all forms of
Representation in a city council.
The other is called Cumulative Voting, which allows voters to distribute a
set number of points among candidates and serves another alternative after a
district court recently ordered Mission Viejo to begin using it32 Like the CVRA's
district voting, it was offered as a solution to minority underrepresentation in
the city and can undermine ideological Representation in the process. As the
main advocate admitted, and UCI Irvine Professor Donald Saari confirmed, a
voting bloc on the political extreme gains an advantage with this system,
because they can put all their points behind a candidate- a form of bullet
voting33 As Block Voting over -represents the majority, Cumulative Voting does
so for minority populations.
29 Craig M. Burnett and Vladimir Kogan, "Ballot (and voter) "exhaustion" under Instant Runoff Voting: An
examination of four ranked -choice elections," Electoral Studies, vol. 37. (Elsevier, 2015), 44-45.
30 Burnett and Kogan, 42.
31 Burnett and Kogan, 42.
32 Alicia Robinson, "Mission Viejo will go its own way with new'cumulative voting' system." Orange
County Register, July 30, 2018, https://www.ocregister.com/2018/07/30/mission-viejo-will-go-its-own-way-
with-new-cumu lative-voti ng -system/.
33Ibid.